AbateFaria wrote:You would be capable of it, Bianca? If so, go ahead... I will read passionately.
I don't know, what I can do is try to provide some general ideas; if there is a contradiction, perhaps it will become less heavy.
Let's start from the bottom with a concrete case.
Let's take the musical works mentioned earlier: Beethoven's fifth symphony and the cathédrale engloutie.
Regarding the first, people speak of death knocking, but this is not an original attribution by the author; regarding the second, instead, people speak of a submerged world, and that is a precise attribution by the author. Now we might ask ourselves what each of the two pieces evokes in us. Personally, the fifth does not remind me of death knocking to me, and it wouldn't even remind me of it if the author himself came to tell me he wrote it for that purpose. The second, however, I must be honest, is quite capable of evoking the magic of a submerged world, or something similar perhaps, even if the author had never programmatically declared it. However, in neither the first nor the second case do I imagine there exists a real or psychological external reference to which this music refers. But above all, even if these actually existed or if the author showed them to me, my perception of the work would not change. Furthermore, what is perceived by any individual other than myself will certainly, or probably, in no way be what I perceive. In essence, so far, I am quoting what Daniele asserts.
From all this, in what way could we deduce that music is therefore not a language? Perhaps a language is such if and only if the communicated data is unambiguous, singular, and uniquely distinguishable? That is not at all the case; on the contrary, it is quite the opposite. Whoever maintains this (I am not talking about Daniele, obviously) loses all the beauty and potential of language, unfortunately without gaining anything.
Or perhaps it is not quite clear what semantics is. As I was saying before, semantics should not be equated with theories of reference. Certainly, denotation is semantic, but so are "models," and indeed in an even stronger way. What these "models" I am talking about are is probably the missing and most difficult part of the entire reasoning, and precisely that which would be most complex to elaborate upon. Perhaps "models" is not the most appropriate term because it can cause confusion for those who use the term in fields other than mathematical logic, but so be it, I didn't decide it. Let's pretend, for now, that we know or have a vague idea of what it is about.
The use of speaking of asemantic arts has become widespread, for example, to contrast figurative arts with those like poetry or literature in general. I believe that this distinction, even if in a certain way legitimate, is very dangerous, especially and precisely when language is brought into the mix. When one speaks of language, in fact, whether willing or unwilling, one must confront semantics.
Do we agree to accept the definition that a language is a conventional set of symbols and rules for manipulating them? Yes? Then tell me who or what you think should establish the validity of a language... I'll tell you, it is semantics!
The semantics (semeion in Greek is the sign or symbol) is precisely that thing which serves to establish whether a certain expression makes sense and is not simply a handful of tiles thrown onto a table.
To speak of asemantic language, therefore, is a contradiction in terms, from which, in my opinion, one must look with caution. When Frank uses this locution, I know well that he means "non-denotative language," but those who do not know such a distinction risk misunderstanding.
In fact, it must be noted that semantics is not the result of language, just as meaning is not the result of an expression, but is its regulatory judge, the one that guarantees its legitimacy.
In this sense, an asemantic work of art is a work devoid of value; rather, it is not even a work, but something thrown together haphazardly. Extremizing, one could instead argue that the more vast the field of "models" that can support a work, the greater the "value" of the work will be. Obviously, I am not talking about the count of individual subjects who all replicate the same model, but about the capacity of a work to pass through the ages, succeeding in always having something to say in each of them. Although this is more rhetorical than anything else.
And still in the previous sense, a non-denotative language is no less powerful or less of a language than a denotative language: it is simply different because it has different semantics and models.
One should also realize that a completely denotative language is also, in a certain way, an illusion. Just think that if I say "look"}
this said, my expression takes on a completely denotative character only if associated with a 'deictic' (that is, the material indication of what I am saying in words), which is an extralinguistic element... and then again...
So, if we agree on the fact that music is somehow an expression made of organized symbols, I don't see how it can escape the definition of language previously given, and therefore, as stated before, we must accept that semantics applies to it. If this were not the case, how could we interpret, analyze, study, teach, and pass down music?
Of course, we can disagree on the starting definitions. But saying that music is music doesn't achieve much; it's like saying an apple is an apple or a dictatorship is a dictatorship.
On the other hand, these are also the reasons why, as Frank says, there is a world between "music" and "marvelous," a world that explains "the openness" that any musical judgment is forced to have.