Processing, narrativity and consequentiality in music

I would like to recap for a moment to understand what the possible answers to the initial question might be.

The following have been defined:

narrativity as "the ability of music to be remembered" or as a "pathway";

syntax as "the set of rules of succession";

temporality defined as "dimension" (subjective or objective?).

From here, however, it is not very clear to me what the criterion could be that establishes "whether a section is a consequence or not of another."

Is it a consequence if it respects the syntax? But rules can be disregarded... so is it a consequence if it respects them a little bit, up to a certain point?

Is it a consequence if it respects narrativity? Or if it is able to suggest a temporal dimension?

It seems to me, however, that at this stage, if one must rely only on these premises, the first definition still appears too weak, the second too broad, and the third ambivalent.

The concept of telos is also interesting, but I believe it can only help laterally.

Is it possible to say more, or must we settle for this? Would it not perhaps be better to first understand what is meant (or what we want to mean) by the term "consequence"?

Bianca wrote:

Is it possible to say something more, or must we settle for this? Wouldn't it be better first to understand what is meant (or what we want to mean) by the term “consequence”?

Let's do it. That is, propose something.

I think we risk slipping into nominalism. There are technical terms and there are non-technical terms. "Consequence" is not a technical term, so we can only define it vaguely, relative to OUR intents (analytical, compositional, or whatever) or by referring to some definition from others. "Consequent" is a term related to musical phraseology, so perhaps we can adapt the term "consequence" to the characteristics of consequent elements. Consequent terms, whether they be phrases, semi-phrases, themes, are consequent in the presence of an antecedent. This dynamic is very strong in Classicism, but it is actually also part of the syntax of the fugue (dux and comes are antecedent and consequent, even if in a contrapuntal rather than strictly melodic dimension). In these reference compositional systems, the presence of a before and an after is very clear, as well as elements that have meaning (or increase their own meaning) in their position of being first or last. Defining this meaning is an analytical operation; it starts from factual data—that is, I find myself with a period and I am the one who must understand what links exist between antecedent and consequent. The history of composition provides examples, a "phrasebook," but does not limit the possibilities. I imagine that this phrasebook can include infinite development techniques (transformation into arpeggios, scales, mirror phrases, progressions, Fortspinnung, etc...), but in a triadic logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, there might also be no strong links between antecedent and consequent. And it is here that a narrative necessity—that of the clash between two elements—actually makes the succession of elements not derived from one another coherent. Perhaps "succession" is not the same as "following one another," but neither is "deriving" the same as "following one another." That is, the links between antecedents and consequents are links whose strength varies according to each individual's free choices. The terms of musical analysis, as in composition, are not written in stone; they always have a margin for interpretation.

And it is from this that I take my answer to your other questions.

narrativity as “the ability of music to be remembered” or as a “pathway”; (...)

It seems to me, however, that (...) the first definition still results in being too weak,

when I read the use of the term narrativity, the adjective narrative, and when I read the use of new analytical insights in the field of "narratology," I have always considered the weakness of definitions as an advantage. We are talking about a very broad, non-normative analytical scenario that, from time to time, pulls new rabbits out of a hat. I am not an expert, I have never happened to use narratological techniques, but I know that there also exists a "phrasebook" of narrative archetypes useful for interpreting certain dynamics of musical discourse. There are initial dogmas to which you must yield, probably. You must "believe" that narrative forms exist in music, even when no one has coined them in the history of composition, or you must believe that human beings perceive according to narrative forms, and therefore even when there is no specific intention from the composer, a perceptual structure remains that is, in a certain sense, "gestalt."

Perhaps I could reformulate the definition by saying that narrativity is the ability of a musical discourse to adapt to narrative archetypes, whether they are intentionally intended by the composer or physiological to the act of listening.

syntax as “the set of rules of succession”; (...)

the second [is] too broad,

I disagree on this. The second is, in fact, far too restrictive, because there is not only a prescribed syntax, but also a "de facto" syntax. I can say that a dominant chord should not be followed by a subdominant chord, but in reality, there are millions of cases where this happens. Even in composition theories, normativity is tenuous, and obviously even less so in analysis. To broaden my definition of syntax even further, I could simply say that syntax is the rule that underlies sequences of musical elements (whether they be pre-established rules or rules of fact). We very often speak of harmonic syntax, but there are melodic syntaxes, formal syntaxes, agogic syntaxes (there are rules, written and unwritten, that define where to steal [time], where to slow down, where to accelerate), expressive syntaxes, dynamic syntaxes. To understand them all, a vague definition seems right to me.

a temporality defined as"} ,

“dimension” (subjective or objective?). (...)

the third bivalent.

e you are picky...

in a strict sense, not even time is objective. I said (because I said it) that time and temporality are different things and temporality is certainly subjective. Like many subjectivities inherent to music, however, it is, at times, shared (there is not only subjectivity and objectivity). Why? Every time for different reasons. It has been demonstrated that there are perceptual mechanisms that create a temporal bond between the listener and musical pieces, especially in the presence of certain specific musical elements. The dragging effect caused by obsessive rhythms acts in an almost unconscious way and intervenes considerably in the processing of a temporality. Processing, precisely because it remains, anyway, a subjective mechanism linked to listening.

It's a shame that you can only give one like, because Thallo's last post deserves at least three

thallo wrote:

"Consequence" is not a technical term [...]. "Consequent" is a term relating to musical phraseology [...].

I will only add a couple of things.

Before Carlos points it out (who is rightly pedantic about Italian), the thread title should be corrected: one does not say 'conseguenzialità', but 'consequenzialità'. In itself, no harm done! However, reflecting on it more deeply, it is necessary to clarify a point: in music, when we speak of a classical musical construction (narrative, teleological, etc.), is the connection between different ideas valid because the second idea is a consequence of the first, or because the first and second ideas are in sequence?

I know, I am playing with terms. However, one often happens to stumble upon an equivocation (corroborated by certain pages of Schoenberg): coherence would be determined by the possibility of tracing the second idea back to the first through some process of motivic derivation, thanks to the presence of some common element. This is sometimes true (it is certainly not the case with the two themes of Brahms' op. 117 no. 2), but in most cases it is not a necessity: the second theme of a sonata form is coherently linked to the first theme not because it derives from it, but because it is part of a common path, and precisely within the scope of this "trajectory" it finds its own function — harmonic, phraseological, emotional... — completely different yet organic to that of the first theme (if the piece has succeeded!).

To give a very famous example: when the second theme of Schubert's Eighth Symphony suddenly stops on the dominant, for a bar of silence followed by an even more unexpected ff on the minor subdominant — an event that becomes increasingly shocking every time it is re-listened to — it seems to me that the strength of this connection is determined precisely by its deliberate non-consequentiality. One could instead speak of narrative logic: an unpredictable interruption of the idyll — a plot twist — nothing is as it was before!

(And yet, there will always be someone observing: this passage is coherent because it is based on the descending fifth, just like the first theme!).

thallo wrote:

Let's do it. I mean, you propose.

Gladly, as long as

thallo wrote:

you are nitpicky...

does not mean: "we already know everything, so we take every clarification as a mere trifle", in which case it goes without saying that it would be useless. Perhaps I condensed the previous message a bit too much.

Suppose I am someone who knows nothing about music theory, nor analysis, nor musicology, as is indeed the case. If I hear or read that the parts of a musical work must have a certain consequentiality, it is legitimate for me to ask questions until the meaning of the statement is clarified to me.

I could, for example, reverse the question and ask: but what can ever establish that B is not a "consequence" of A, or more "weakly," that one section has nothing to do with another? In this way, perhaps the need for an "not too vague" answer becomes more compelling.

If the answer at the end were: "the experts establish it," then I would have to surrender, unless I wanted to study a little to become one of them, in which case those who precede me will be obliged (so to speak) to give me clarifications.

I believe that the "weakening" of a theory often works to its advantage, but not before it has been acquired on a sound basis. This applies to all fields. I can quite well accept defining a concept imprecisely, as long as I am aware of the fact that I may be called upon to provide further clarification when asked, or am aware of the fact that the concept itself is imprecise and therefore I do not truly possess it. In effect, there are few human concepts founded on this second type.

To say, for example, that "consequence" can only be defined in a "vague" way means either not knowing the meaning of the term or not possessing its concept. Furthermore, it is historically false. The definition of this term is one of the greatest successes in the history of human thought. One may also disagree with it, criticize it, or improve it, but one must at least know it first. Human reasoning is largely inferential in nature. Even "associative" reasoning could be read from an inferential point of view.

With all probability, therefore, you meant that the term is a vague term in the musical field. Of course, there is no definition of it in music theory texts (at least as far as I know). But we must then think of giving it another name. Which would lead the answer to the topic's question to be:

"in music, one cannot establish whether B is a consequence of A, or not."

If that is how things stand, however, we must accept all the consequences (consequences?!?, again?, oh no!) and we will never be able to use this as a criterion for constructing or evaluating a musical work.

Otherwise, we will have to strive (ourselves or someone else more skilled and capable than us) to perfect our knowledge as far as possible (i.e., always). As you do in your discourse, for example, with interesting insights. If I interpret correctly what you are saying, it is up to the listener to establish the link between antecedent and consequent, based on a "phraseology" made available by the repertoire (an idea, moreover, that has a certain supporting literature, very much like common law, let's say), which is neither exhaustive nor binding. In this "openness," I see positively the possibility of expanding the aforementioned "phraseology." And this is certainly a good thing from my point of view, also because it calls into question the possibility of a "recursive" definition (to be verified, anyway) of at least part of the problem (and recursive definitions are founded definitions). However, the usual ignorant friend might insist and ask you or me again:

"but who validates this openness? If it is something that does not fall within the phraseology (I am simplifying by using my ignorant friend's words), or cannot be deduced from it in some way, then who decides it is okay?"

And then we are back to square one asking ourselves why there should be someone more noble than me to decide if something is okay or not. Because they have better taste? Because they have more money and therefore pay for this rather than that (a hypothesis, by the way, not detached from reality)? Because they have more "experience"? I would not be happy with such a thing unless I accepted in one way or another again that:

"in music, one cannot establish whether B is a consequence of A, or not."

Unfortunately, many people who love music feel somehow protected against the arrogance of rigor by what they think to be the nature of music itself. I say unfortunately because this type of person (forgive the expression that I detest) erroneously believes that rigor is a cage for fantasy, while it is quite the opposite and this more than

everything else in the world, it is music itself that teaches it. Now, I am not speaking of rigor in the application of the rules of harmony and counterpoint or others like those you mentioned, but of rigor in research and understanding. It is an attitude that is clearly perceived especially in discussions on the subject. Many dialogues and comparisons, if not all, result in a clash of opinions which, at best, settles on matters of taste. And behind these processes always hides the assumption that one cannot prove anything in music anyway, that there is no "scientific" method to resolve issues, because after all

"in music, one cannot establish whether B is a consequence of A, or not."

And so everything is brought before the tribunal of "experts," since ultimately the law comes from them, and such "experts" in turn form ranks of other "experts," and the game repeats itself.

Now let us be clear, it could indeed be that music must remain forever, in its most intimate recesses, relegated to the sphere of opinion and authority. However, I hope that research will continue, with or without me, until at least this proposition presents itself not as a dogma, but as a matter of fact—if not proven, at least founded. Until then, accommodate even those who seem pedantic to you, because they probably act with good intentions. But above all, until then, anyone who truly loves music should not make the mistake of believing that if someone could ever establish by calculation that B is indeed a consequence of A and that C, on the other hand, truly cannot be, this proof and this calculation would make music gray and predictable; because it is quite the opposite. For my part, I can only say that if I were to see that day coming, I would immediately stop loving music because I would see its world inexorably shrinking.

I understand well that it is all too easy to be misunderstood, and the fault is undoubtedly entirely mine, because I cannot help but take for granted, consciously, things that in fact cannot be taken for granted. But if the intention is to increase our awareness, as I have said many times, this is a surmountable problem (not easily, but surmountable). What I thought was emerging from the discussion is the "contrast" that the term narrativity brings regarding the term "consequence." This is because I am likely starting from definitions that are not shared here. The term narrativity, which is not a musicological term just as the term consequence is not, speaks of an hermeneutic aspect of the object (put poorly, it indicates not only the narration but also its interpretation), whereas consequence speaks of a logical aspect. If you (generic you) do not distinguish these two dimensions, you end up confusing consequence with narrativity and giving this vague and too weak definitions, even if they are very indicative of a "preconception." The fact that narrativity is defined as the characteristic of music to be remembered is topical: within it lies the entire mixture with consequentiality and the link that both have with time and temporality. From my point of view, this reduction is viable in narrative, in theater, or in (part of) poetry. Less so in music. I mean that in music, there is a great risk in implementing this confusion, precisely because one would be forced to renounce a priori a dimension that is potentially of boundless fertility and vastness. It is precisely that dimension, without which, as I was saying before, I would see this world deflate in a single breath. Imagine if someone suddenly told a seagull it can only fly on a flat plane!

As far as time is concerned, a corresponding argument applies, which from your mention, seems to you to understand and be able to sustain. However, it is not a parallel argument, but one that is strictly connected. My consideration might have sounded provocative, but I assure you it is the point on which I have found the most convergence so far.

So my suggestion is not to give up on that distinction, and to strive to understand how to avoid giving it up. I don't know, I hope I have made my "proposal" clear. If it isn't, I can try to do better; if it doesn't seem sensible, well, such is life.

Your comment is very detailed.

But I must clarify one thing immediately:

1) I was not aggressive with you. But I have a very clear feeling (here as in the discussion on Beethoven) that you are being aggressive with me. For what reason? I said you are nitpicky and you replied that "we" know everything. These seem like different levels to me. I am not here to pontificate; I make available the things I know, and dozens of times my messages contain the phrase "I am not an expert." Because I do not consider myself an expert in anything. I am open to discussion, but I do not like comments focused on demolishing my messages. It is also for this reason that I began my previous intervention with a calm "propose."

2) I intervened in this discussion without having participated in the one of which this (as I understand it) is an extension. Only now from your comment do I realize that there were precedents. I was not aware of them.

3) In your messages, I notice a certain systematicity. I would be curious to understand what studies you are conducting or have conducted. There are many things in this last message of yours, many methodological elements, that clash with the typical way of treating musicology. I like to clarify issues, not because I speak ex cathedra, but ultimately understanding what your background is could help me show you a different point of view.

Bianca wrote:

Suppose I am someone who knows nothing about music theory, nor analysis, nor musicology, as I actually am.

this is a premise that complicates things. There will be statements that you will have to accept as dogma...

If I hear or read that the parts of a musical work must have a certain consequentiality, it is legitimate for me to ask questions until the meaning of the statement is clarified to me.

I could, for example, reverse the question and ask: but what can ever establish that B is not a "consequence" of A, or more "weakly," that one section has nothing to do with another? In this way, perhaps the need for a "not too vague" answer becomes more compelling.

you treat musical terminology as if it were a formalized mathematical system, with truth tables to which propositions are subjected.

It doesn't work like that.

I believe that the "weakening" of a theory often works to its advantage, but not before it has been firmly established. This applies to all fields. I can perfectly well accept defining a concept imprecisely, as long as I am aware that I may be called upon to provide further clarification when asked, or am aware that the concept itself is imprecise and therefore I do not truly possess it. In fact, few human concepts founded on this second type exist.

modern musical analysis techniques should be experienced as proposals, not as truths, as theories in a strong sense. They interpret music in their turn; they do not decipher it. Furthermore, if one speaks of musical analysis, examples should always be provided alongside. And here, unfortunately, I am putting my hands up by saying that I am not an expert in musical narratology, I have never performed analysis in this sense; I can only provide elements that I have, in turn, taken from sporadic readings.

To say, for example, that "consequence" is definable only in a "vague" way means either not knowing the meaning of the term or not possessing its concept.

in musical technical language, the term "consequence" DOES NOT EXIST. If you have heard it, you heard it in a colloquial or metaphorical sense.

With all probability, therefore, you meant that the term is a vague term in the musical field.

no, sorry, here to me it seems obvious that you have it in for me... to me it seemed OBVIOUS that I was referring to a musical semantic field.

“in music one cannot establish whether B is a consequence of A, or not.”

no, then... we don't understand each other... in music almost nothing is established. The objective data of a musical analysis are few, and it is good practice to follow a methodical approach in their definition. Therefore, since there is no musical technical characteristic known as "consequence," it is true to say that there is no possibility of objectively ascertaining any consequence in a musical piece. But, even setting aside the discussion I tried to have about consequents (elements I did not explain because I took their knowledge for granted), the moment you use the term consequence in a broad sense rather than technically, then you can pair it with terms like organicity, elaboration, development, which are the substance of our discussion.

These specifics regarding the term "consequence" are, in my opinion, pure nominalism. I am following your line of reasoning, but it is an approach I do not share.

Otherwise we will have to strive (ourselves or someone else better and more capable than us) to perfect our knowledge as far as possible (i.e., always). As you do in your discourse, for example, with interesting insights. If I interpret correctly what you are saying, it is up to the listener to establish the link between antecedent and consequent,

no. Antecedent and consequent are two precise things, at least according to Schoenbergian phraseological theory. They are the two sections of a period, namely two phrases that have a certain relationship with each other. The simple definition of antecedent and consequent is merely positional, and it is transferable to other musical elements besides phrases. In my wretched attempt to question the characteristics of consequents, namely their supposed "consequentiality," I was bringing into play a series of possibilities, supported by music history, but as examples of various possible forms, which are nonetheless irreducible.

However, the usual ignorant friend might insist and ask you or me again:

“but who validates this openness? If it is something that does not fall within the phraseology (I am simplifying by keeping my ignorant friend's parts), or if it can be deduced from it in some way, or who decides that it is okay?”

but what openness are you talking about?!"}

Validate?! There is no music tribunal that decides which consequences are consequential and which are not! Here we speak of millions of musical works that have provided us with fields of analysis. The analyst, like the listener, resigns himself to what is; he does not decide how a composition can be written, but rather develops models to understand them or to enjoy them more fully.

And so everything is brought before the tribunal of "experts," because ultimately the law comes from them, and such "experts" in turn form ranks of other "experts," and the game repeats itself.

I would really like to understand how much this is a generic statement and how much it refers to me or others. Not because I have always considered myself a champion of argumentation. There are no "proofs" in the scientific sense in music, but there are arguments in favor, data, sources. And in my small way, I have always tried to provide as much as I could.

But I must say that this discussion is quite unpleasant. I might sound like a victim, but I feel unfairly put on the spot.

As for the rest, I will not express myself.

I often read and am certain that in music 2+2 does not make 4. This does not make music a science but an art. Time has always its reasons, if something is truly art ... sooner or later posterity will surely know it

For now, let's be good

I have very little time during this period, I'll just throw it out there... art from my point of view shows and does not show. If this is true, the aesthetic aspect counts more than the scientific one (to reconnect with what Dies Irae writes).

Curiosity, but are we referring to historicized works or new developments like those from the Biennale? I ask because in my opinion the difference is substantial; if the code is known and "theorized," internalized and catechized... there is little to be done

A very advanced issue and it is difficult to approach systematically.

I observe that:

- Music is written by composers, who should know it (even Mozart used to go study, not to mention the kilometers Bach traveled to go to Lübeck and his late nights on Frescobaldi)... therefore knowledge is the foundation

- Anyone who wants to seek any kind of relationship between compositional elements should know music. One of the main paths is analysis

If we are not talking about Sanremo, where perhaps the only thing to recognize is the difference between verse and chorus… and for the umpteenth time even my 3-year-old child can do it. For art music (or should we say cultured?) perhaps one should have a bit of knowledge and culture (?)

Obviously with all the shades of gray in the matter...

A page by Lachenmann suggests to me that narrativity might be nothing more than a mode of listening (as are most categories of musical analysis, for that matter).

Anton Webern's Orchesterstück op. 10 no. 4 has nothing narrative about it: six bars, less than half a minute, a few short sounds scattered here and there. Lachenmann dedicates a couple of pages to a tight analysis of the tiny events of the piece, grouping them by affinity, identifying their consequentiality (precisely!). Then, suddenly, he changes register.

The whole thing is nothing other than a moonlight serenade of fluted sound, with echoes coming from where the beautiful trumpets play and the death-announcing trombone, an instrument of universal judgment, responds, until the military drum plays the retreat, disturbing the idyll, and the lover begins to pluck the mandolin under his arm, while his beloved signals to him with a violin figuration.

[Helmut Lachenmann, Listening is useless without listening. Possibilities and difficulties.]

This Webern, re-heard through Mahler's ear, reveals certain things.

The main one seems to me the possibility of reading a novel in an aphorism: it is a matter of time scales. With Mahler we can sit with all the calm in the world; a Symphony lasts two hours, we have all the time to enter his sound world, understand what is happening, follow the drama, participate emotionally (like reading a great late-19th-century novel). Webern, by comparison, is incredibly sparse and elliptical: we don't even have time to realize the piece has started before it is already finished. And yet Lachenmann demonstrates that by observing music through a magnifying glass, equipped with great attention and great imagination, the dynamics are the same.

In short, it is not the quality of the sonic events that determines narrativity; apparently, it is not even the relationship between the events "in themselves"; perhaps it is the possibility of describing such relationships through the categories of narration, complete with characters, conflicts, and resolutions (but here I am entering the realm of hypothesis).

Open content (youtube)

Interesting Red and on this subject

RedScharlach wrote:

Webern, by comparison, is incredibly sparse and elliptical: we don't even have time to realize the piece has started, and it is already finished. Yet Lachenmann demonstrates that by observing music through a magnifying glass, equipped with great attention and great imagination, the dynamics are the same.

I would also like to point out that one can speak of overheating and cooling down of material, techniques that Webern knew how to dose well and which allowed him to manage the tensive discourse. I don't know if a tensive discourse is also narrative, but from certain points of view it could be so. The consequentiality between a (musical) element that overheats and cools down I think is easily identifiable... at least for a musician.

I propose this interesting quote by Messiaen regarding rhythm and the listener:

[…] he [
the listener
] will not have time, at the concert, to verify the non-transpositions, the non-inversions and, in that moment, these problems will no longer interest him:
to be seduced, that will be his only desire
.
And that is exactly what will happen
:he will undergo despite himself the strange fascination of impossibilities
: that certain effect of tonal ubiquity of non-transposition, that certain unity of movement in the non-inversion of rhythms (or when beginning and end are confused because they are identical); all things that will progressively lead him to this kind of "theological rainbow" that seeks to be the musical language, and from which we seek incitement and theoretical support.

" I believe that the 'weakening' of a theory often works to its advantage, but not before it has been established with foundation. "

If I have an alibi that exonerates me from having killed a person, but then Sherlock Holmes notes that my alibi suffers from weakening, I would say that all this does not work to the advantage of the alibi. Quite the contrary!

If Aristotle says that the vacuum does not exist, but then Pascal and Torricelli demonstrate that it does, it occurs to me that Aristotelian theories undergo a weakening that does not work to their own advantage.

" in music one cannot establish whether B is a consequence of A, or not."

And so everything is brought before the court of "experts," because ultimately the law comes from them, and such "experts" in turn form ranks of other "experts," and the game repeats itself. "

But who are these experts and why could they be able to have an answer if you yourself say that it is not possible to establish the consequentiality of two (let's call them) events? If there exist these experts who are able to establish whether B is a consequence of A, then the sentence "in music one cannot etc." is false!

" But above all, until then, anyone who truly loves music should not make the mistake of believing that, if someone could ever establish with a calculation that B is indeed a consequence of A and that C, on the other hand, truly cannot be, this proof and this calculation will make music gray and predictable, because it is quite the opposite. For my part, I can only say that, if I were to see that day coming, I would immediately stop loving music because I would see its world inexorably shrinking."

I didn't understand this sentence, you say: if the day comes when music will be formulated via an algorithm, whoever interprets it as gray and predictable will be making a mistake. But will you yourself stop loving it? That is, would you also do what you define as a mistake?

"I understand well that it is all too easy to be misunderstood and the fault is undoubtedly entirely mine, because I can only consciously take for granted things that, instead, cannot be taken for granted. But if the intention is to increase our awareness, as I have said many times, this is a surmountable problem (not easily, but surmountable). What I thought was emerging from the discussion is the 'contrast' that the term narrativity brings towards the term 'consequence.' This is because I am likely starting from initial definitions that are not shared here. The term narrativity, which is not a musicological term just as the term consequence is not, speaks of an hermeneutic aspect of the object (put poorly, it indicates not only the narration but also its interpretation), whereas consequence speaks of a logical aspect. "

so in essence you are saying, if we want to use the terms narrativity and consequence, we either use them with their TRUE meaning or we choose other words that better suit the subject?

Very interesting discussion"}

Talentuoso wrote:

Curiosity, but are we referring to historicized works or novelties like those from the Biennale?

Narrativity certainly concerns music of the classical/romantic/late-romantic era, but it is also a concept pertinent to "novelties like the Biennale" (not all of them, obviously!). For example, in an interview cited in the essay Narrative forms and contrapuntal devices in the orchestral music of Ivan Fedele by Gianluigi Mattietti, Fedele speaks of the opposition between two different conceptions of time: one dynamic and narrative (Western tradition), the other reflective and meditative (Eastern tradition). This opposition is found in some of his works, characterizing different "time zones" (thanks to Dusapin!).

To provide a counter-example, it seems to me that narrativity has nothing to do with the music of Marco Momi.

I'm just throwing this out there.

Are we able to offer examples of narrative music and non-narrative music? Each in their own :-)

RedScharlach wrote:

A page by Lachenmann suggests to me that narrativity might be nothing more than a mode of listening (as is the case with most categories of musical analysis, for that matter).

In short, it is not the quality of the sound events that determines narrativity; apparently, it is not even the relationship between events "in itself"; perhaps it is the possibility of describing such relationships through the categories of narration, complete with characters, conflicts, and resolutions.

Personally I agree, as I have said previously, narrativity (in literature) in a certain way "opposes" the expository (but also interpretive) procedure of a "scientific" discourse.

thallo wrote:

i'm just throwing it out there.

Are we able to offer examples of narrative music and non-narrative music? Each their own :-)

my two cents:

Cage 4'33": narrativity yes, consequentiality no

Clementi op. 44: narrativity no, consequentiality yes

So, I was indeed a bit cryptic. I will try to explain what I meant.

To put it intuitively, a "theory" is a set of theorems. When I spoke of the "weakening" of a theory, I did not mean that by removing "proofs" from a theorem, that theorem gains something and becomes easier to prove. But a "theory" can be intuitively seen as a tool (mostly formal) capable of representing possible "worlds." In a sense, one could say that the more stringent and "strong" a theory is, the more unambiguous, delimited, "restricted," and unequivocal the world it refers to will be. The "weaker" the theory is, the more vast the possible worlds it characterizes are.

I know that for those not working in the field, these concepts can seem a bit difficult, but I tried anyway, and the risks I took are evident. When I spoke of weakening, I did so to meet the needs expressed in the comments, but also because it obviously makes sense. The choices we can make regarding the direction to take (strengthening or weakening) are in a sense arbitrary, but they can only be truly arbitrary if we are nonetheless able to push ourselves in both directions, i.e., if we have awareness.

As for the other issue, also poorly expressed here, I simply wanted to say that if I were to discover that the aesthetic evaluation of music must be based solely on the opinion of whomever, I would lose interest in it. If someone convinced me of the fact that the aesthetic evaluation of music is an "uncontrollable" phenomenon and that one cannot speak of an ontological difference within it, I would probably abandon the field. Usually, I never express sharp and definitive opinions, but here I want to be very clear: for me, music is not all the same (mind you, this is not necessarily a distinction of genres) precisely because, compared to other arts, it "can" have an extra dimension. It is not necessary for it to be present in every expression, but it is important that it exists as a possibility. The dimension I am talking about is precisely its predisposition to having a "meta-theory" (I use this term only so as not to create confusion with music theory in the common sense), a meta-theory with a "constructive" value and not just a descriptive one.

The discussion is endless, even if I do not know of any specific literature truly dedicated to it and therefore I am unable to say whether it is a successful path or not.

Finally, to respond to the last point, I could say that what we are talking about is precisely the possibility of extending the concept of consequence to the musical field. I start from the hypothesis that this, with the necessary precautions, is feasible, obviously respecting its original meaning. Otherwise, I also believe we should use different terms.

It pleases me greatly that someone shows interest in this type of reasoning. I believe that interest can never come from understanding, but must always start from courage. Understanding comes at the end and can say whether courage was well spent or was of no use.

Perhaps then it is a matter of terminology; I would prefer to say that it is a theory with undefined boundaries but, precisely, it is a matter of choosing words.

A stronger and more stringent theory requires a smaller field of research, I agree; you cannot analyze Indian music with the same yardstick used to analyze Schoenberg, so perhaps it would be better to have a theory "whose characterized possible worlds are vast"? Perhaps yes, it would be a general theory and we all (at least I do, from time to time) are always looking for a rule that always works.

You speak of arbitrary choices and consequently, I link the two things. It is logical in tonal language that the dominant seventh going to a tonic is characterized by a seventh degree of the chord that resolves downwards and a leading tone of the tonality that resolves upwards. This is an example of tonal logic, whether scholastic or not; statistically, a dominant seventh going to a I degree will behave this way at least 80% of the time. Other times the seventh will take longer to resolve, or it will be the leading tone that takes more time, creating a similar situation nonetheless. I would say that beyond this small example, we are quite capable of encoding (classical) tonal language through an algorithm, a fine procedure born from our logic. But it is not the same logic as "If men are mortal and Berio is a man, then Berio is mortal". Or rather, this example would also work on Saturn, forever. Whereas instead, who knows why, one day the leading tone, instead of resolving, will prefer to stay there and not resolve by ascending a semitone; it won't suit someone, it will suit someone else, anyway that's what it will do, and then the rule "the leading tone must resolve to the tonic" will be replaced with "often the leading tone resolves to the tonic"! And then we will have to, as you were saying, find small theories that work for every example, or find a general one that contains quite a few exceptions. Or arbitrary rules that say (as the good Gedalge sometimes says) this thing shouldn't be done because it shouldn't be done, or it should be done because "the heart has its reasons etc.". But then the concept of consequence, which refers to the logical-mathematical field and has been extended to the musical one, goes to hell..